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/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it would be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
*
* Further, this software is distributed without any warranty that it is
* free of the rightful claim of any third person regarding infringement
* or the like. Any license provided herein, whether implied or
* otherwise, applies only to this software file. Patent licenses, if
* any, provided herein do not apply to combinations of this program with
* other software, or any other product whatsoever.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
* with this program; if not, write the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59
* Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston MA 02111-1307, USA.
*
* Contact information: Silicon Graphics, Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy,
* Mountain View, CA 94043, or:
*
* http://www.sgi.com
*
* For further information regarding this notice, see:
*
* http://oss.sgi.com/projects/GenInfo/SGIGPLNoticeExplan/
*/
#include <xfs.h>
#include <linux/acl_ea.h>
STATIC int xfs_acl_setmode(vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *);
STATIC void xfs_acl_filter_mode(mode_t, xfs_acl_t *);
STATIC void xfs_acl_get_endian(xfs_acl_t *);
STATIC int xfs_acl_access(uid_t, gid_t, xfs_acl_t *, mode_t, cred_t *);
STATIC int xfs_acl_invalid(xfs_acl_t *);
STATIC void xfs_acl_sync_mode(mode_t, xfs_acl_t *);
STATIC void xfs_acl_get_attr(vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *, int, int *);
STATIC void xfs_acl_set_attr(vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *, int, int *);
STATIC int xfs_acl_allow_set(vnode_t *, int);
/*
* Test for existence of the extended attributes which implement
* the system.posix_acl_access and system.posix_acl_default attrs
*/
int
posix_acl_access_exists(vnode_t *vp)
{
xfs_acl_t xacl;
return _ACL_GET_ACCESS(vp, &xacl);
}
int
posix_acl_default_exists(vnode_t *vp)
{
xfs_acl_t xacl;
return _ACL_GET_DEFAULT(vp, &xacl);
}
/*
* Convert from extended attribute representation to in-memory for XFS.
*/
STATIC int
acl_ext_attr_to_xfs(acl_ea_header *src, size_t size, xfs_acl_t *dest)
{
char *src_acl = (char*)src;
acl_ea_header *header;
int n, count;
xfs_acl_entry_t *dest_entry;
acl_ea_entry *src_entry;
if (!src_acl || !dest)
return EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(acl_ea_header))
return EINVAL;
header = (acl_ea_header *)src;
if (header->a_version != cpu_to_le32(ACL_EA_VERSION))
return EINVAL;
count = acl_ea_count(size);
if (count <= 0 || count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return EINVAL;
memset(dest, 0, sizeof(xfs_acl_t));
dest->acl_cnt = count;
src_entry = (acl_ea_entry*) (src_acl + sizeof(acl_ea_header));
dest_entry = &dest->acl_entry[0];
for (n = 0; n < count; n++, src_entry++, dest_entry++) {
dest_entry->ae_tag = le16_to_cpu(src_entry->e_tag);
dest_entry->ae_perm = le16_to_cpu(src_entry->e_perm);
switch(dest_entry->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
dest_entry->ae_id =
le32_to_cpu(src_entry->e_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
dest_entry->ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
return EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Comparison function called from qsort().
* Primary key is ae_tag, secondary key is ae_id.
*/
STATIC int
acl_entry_compare(const void *va, const void *vb)
{
xfs_acl_entry_t *a = (xfs_acl_entry_t *)va,
*b = (xfs_acl_entry_t *)vb;
if (a->ae_tag == b->ae_tag)
return (a->ae_id - b->ae_id);
return (a->ae_tag - b->ae_tag);
}
/*
* Convert from in-memory XFS to extended attribute representation.
*/
STATIC int
acl_xfs_to_ext_attr(xfs_acl_t *src, acl_ea_header *ext_acl, size_t size)
{
size_t new_size = acl_ea_size(src->acl_cnt);
acl_ea_entry *dest_entry;
xfs_acl_entry_t *src_entry;
int n;
if (size < new_size)
return -E2BIG;
/* Need to sort src XFS ACL by <ae_tag,ae_id> */
qsort(src->acl_entry, src->acl_cnt, sizeof(src->acl_entry[0]),
acl_entry_compare);
ext_acl->a_version = cpu_to_le32(ACL_EA_VERSION);
dest_entry = &ext_acl->a_entries[0];
src_entry = &src->acl_entry[0];
for (n=0; n < src->acl_cnt; n++, dest_entry++, src_entry++) {
dest_entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(src_entry->ae_tag);
dest_entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(src_entry->ae_perm);
switch(src_entry->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
dest_entry->e_id =
cpu_to_le32(src_entry->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
dest_entry->e_id =
cpu_to_le32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return new_size;
}
int
xfs_acl_vget(vnode_t *vp, void *acl, size_t size, int kind)
{
acl_ea_header *ext_acl = acl;
xfs_acl_t xfs_acl;
vattr_t va;
int error;
if (!size) {
/*
* This is an overrestimate of the max size - used
* to size a buffer for a subsequent "get" call.
*/
size = sizeof(acl_ea_header);
size += sizeof(acl_ea_entry) * XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES;
return size;
}
VN_HOLD(vp);
error = _MAC_VACCESS(vp, get_current_cred(), VREAD);
if (error)
goto out;
memset(&xfs_acl, 0, sizeof(xfs_acl));
xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, &xfs_acl, kind, &error);
if (!error && xfs_acl_invalid(&xfs_acl)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!error && (kind == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)) {
/* For Access ACLs, get the mode for synchronization. */
va.va_mask = AT_MODE;
VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, 0, sys_cred, error);
}
/* XXX: tes TODO - audit use of XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT */
/*
* If there was an error retrieving or validating the ACL or
* an Access ACL and we had trouble synchronizing the mode with the
* ACL, then the ACL is deemed NOT PRESENT.
*/
if (error)
xfs_acl.acl_cnt = XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT;
else if (kind == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
xfs_acl_sync_mode(va.va_mode, &xfs_acl);
if (!error)
error = -acl_xfs_to_ext_attr(&xfs_acl, ext_acl, size);
out:
VN_RELE(vp);
return -error;
}
int
xfs_acl_vremove(vnode_t *vp, int kind)
{
int error;
VN_HOLD(vp);
error = xfs_acl_allow_set(vp, kind);
if (!error) {
VOP_ATTR_REMOVE(vp, kind == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT?
SGI_ACL_DEFAULT: SGI_ACL_FILE,
ATTR_ROOT, sys_cred, error);
if (error == ENOATTR)
error = 0; /* 'scool */
}
VN_RELE(vp);
return -error;
}
int
xfs_acl_vset(vnode_t *vp, void *acl, size_t size, int kind)
{
acl_ea_header *ext_acl = acl;
xfs_acl_t xfs_acl;
int error;
if (!acl)
return -EINVAL;
error = acl_ext_attr_to_xfs(ext_acl, size, &xfs_acl);
if (error)
return -error;
VN_HOLD(vp);
error = xfs_acl_allow_set(vp, kind);
if (error)
goto out;
/* Incoming ACL exists, set file mode based on its value */
if (kind == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
xfs_acl_setmode(vp, &xfs_acl);
xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, &xfs_acl, kind, &error);
out:
VN_RELE(vp);
return -error;
}
int
xfs_acl_iaccess(xfs_inode_t *ip, mode_t mode, cred_t *cr)
{
xfs_acl_t acl;
/* If the file has no ACL return -1. */
if (xfs_attr_fetch(ip, SGI_ACL_FILE, (char *)&acl, sizeof(xfs_acl_t)))
return -1;
xfs_acl_get_endian(&acl);
/* If the file has an empty ACL return -1. */
if (acl.acl_cnt == XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT)
return -1;
/* Synchronize ACL with mode bits */
xfs_acl_sync_mode(ip->i_d.di_mode, &acl);
return xfs_acl_access(ip->i_d.di_uid, ip->i_d.di_gid, &acl, mode, cr);
}
STATIC int
xfs_acl_allow_set(vnode_t *vp, int kind)
{
vattr_t va;
int error;
error = ENOTDIR;
if (kind == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && vp->v_type != VDIR)
return error;
error = EROFS;
if (vp->v_vfsp->vfs_flag & VFS_RDONLY)
return error;
error = _MAC_VACCESS(vp, NULL, VWRITE);
if (error)
return error;
va.va_mask = AT_UID;
VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, 0, NULL, error);
if (error)
return error;
error = EACCES;
if (va.va_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
return error;
return 0;
}
/*
* The access control process to determine the access permission:
* if uid == file owner id, use the file owner bits.
* if gid == file owner group id, use the file group bits.
* scan ACL for a maching user or group, and use matched entry
* permission. Use total permissions of all matching group entries,
* until all acl entries are exhausted. The final permission produced
* by matching acl entry or entries needs to be & with group permission.
* if not owner, owning group, or matching entry in ACL, use file
* other bits.
*/
STATIC int
xfs_acl_capability_check(mode_t mode, cred_t *cr)
{
if ((mode & ACL_READ) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return EACCES;
if ((mode & ACL_WRITE) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return EACCES;
if ((mode & ACL_EXECUTE) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return EACCES;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note: cr is only used here for the capability check if the ACL test fails.
* It is not used to find out the credentials uid or groups etc, as was
* done in IRIX. It is assumed that the uid and groups for the current
* thread are taken from "current" instead of the cr parameter.
*/
STATIC int
xfs_acl_access(uid_t fuid, gid_t fgid, xfs_acl_t *fap, mode_t md, cred_t *cr)
{
int i;
xfs_acl_entry_t matched;
int maskallows = -1; /* true, but not 1, either */
int allows;
int seen_userobj = 0;
matched.ae_tag = 0; /* Invalid type */
md >>= 6; /* Normalize the bits for comparison */
for (i = 0; i < fap->acl_cnt; i++) {
/*
* Break out if we've got a user_obj entry or
* a user entry and the mask (and have processed USER_OBJ)
*/
if (matched.ae_tag == ACL_USER_OBJ)
break;
if (matched.ae_tag == ACL_USER) {
if (maskallows != -1 && seen_userobj)
break;
if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag != ACL_MASK &&
fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag != ACL_USER_OBJ)
continue;
}
/* True if this entry allows the requested access */
allows = ((fap->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & md) == md);
switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
seen_userobj = 1;
if (fuid != current->fsuid)
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
case ACL_USER:
if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid)
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
if ((matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP) && !allows)
continue;
if (!in_group_p(fgid))
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
if ((matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP) && !allows)
continue;
if (!in_group_p(fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id))
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_GROUP;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
maskallows = allows;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
if (matched.ae_tag != 0)
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_OTHER;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
}
}
/*
* First possibility is that no matched entry allows access.
* The capability to override DAC may exist, so check for it.
*/
switch (matched.ae_tag) {
case ACL_OTHER:
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
if (matched.ae_perm)
return 0;
break;
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP:
if (maskallows && matched.ae_perm)
return 0;
break;
case 0:
break;
}
return xfs_acl_capability_check(md, cr);
}
/*
* ACL validity checker.
* This acl validation routine checks each ACL entry read in makes sense.
*/
STATIC int
xfs_acl_invalid(xfs_acl_t *aclp)
{
xfs_acl_entry_t *entry, *e;
int user = 0, group = 0, other = 0, mask = 0, mask_required = 0;
int i, j;
if (aclp == NULL)
goto acl_invalid;
if (aclp->acl_cnt > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
goto acl_invalid;
for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
entry = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
switch (entry->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
if (user++)
goto acl_invalid;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
if (group++)
goto acl_invalid;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
if (other++)
goto acl_invalid;
break;
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
for (j = i + 1; j < aclp->acl_cnt; j++) {
e = &aclp->acl_entry[j];
if (e->ae_id == entry->ae_id &&
e->ae_tag == entry->ae_tag)
goto acl_invalid;
}
mask_required++;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
if (mask++)
goto acl_invalid;
break;
default:
goto acl_invalid;
}
}
if (!user || !group || !other || (mask_required && !mask))
goto acl_invalid;
else
return 0;
acl_invalid:
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* Do ACL endian conversion.
*/
STATIC void
xfs_acl_get_endian(xfs_acl_t *aclp)
{
xfs_acl_entry_t *ace, *end;
INT_SET(aclp->acl_cnt, ARCH_CONVERT, aclp->acl_cnt);
end = &aclp->acl_entry[0]+aclp->acl_cnt;
for (ace=&aclp->acl_entry[0]; ace < end; ace++) {
INT_SET(ace->ae_tag, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_tag);
INT_SET(ace->ae_id, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_id);
INT_SET(ace->ae_perm, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_perm);
}
}
/*
* Get the ACL from the EA and do endian conversion.
*/
STATIC void
xfs_acl_get_attr(vnode_t *vp, xfs_acl_t *aclp, int kind, int *error)
{
int len = sizeof(xfs_acl_t);
VOP_ATTR_GET(vp, kind==ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ? SGI_ACL_FILE: SGI_ACL_DEFAULT,
(char *)aclp, &len, ATTR_ROOT, sys_cred, *error);
if (*error)
return;
xfs_acl_get_endian(aclp);
}
/*
* Set the EA with the ACL and do endian conversion.
*/
STATIC void
xfs_acl_set_attr(vnode_t *vp, xfs_acl_t *aclp, int kind, int *error)
{
xfs_acl_entry_t *ace, *newace, *end;
xfs_acl_t newacl;
int len = sizeof(xfs_acl_t) - (sizeof(xfs_acl_entry_t)*(XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES - aclp->acl_cnt));
end = &aclp->acl_entry[0]+aclp->acl_cnt;
for (ace = &aclp->acl_entry[0], newace = &newacl.acl_entry[0];
ace < end;
ace++, newace++) {
INT_SET(newace->ae_tag, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_tag);
INT_SET(newace->ae_id, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_id);
INT_SET(newace->ae_perm, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_perm);
}
INT_SET(newacl.acl_cnt, ARCH_CONVERT, aclp->acl_cnt);
VOP_ATTR_SET(vp, kind==ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ? SGI_ACL_FILE: SGI_ACL_DEFAULT,
(char *)&newacl, len, ATTR_ROOT, sys_cred, *error);
}
int
xfs_acl_vtoacl(vnode_t *vp, xfs_acl_t *access_acl, xfs_acl_t *default_acl)
{
int error = 0;
vattr_t va;
if (access_acl != NULL) {
/*
* Get the Access ACL and the mode. If either cannot
* be obtained for some reason, invalidate the access ACL.
*/
xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, access_acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, &error);
if (!error) {
/* Got the ACL, need the mode... */
va.va_mask = AT_MODE;
VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, 0, sys_cred, error);
}
if (error)
access_acl->acl_cnt = XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT;
else /* We have a good ACL and the file mode, synchronize. */
xfs_acl_sync_mode(va.va_mode, access_acl);
}
if (default_acl != NULL) {
xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, default_acl, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, &error);
if (error)
default_acl->acl_cnt = XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT;
}
return error;
}
/*
* This function retrieves the parent directory's acl, processes it
* and lets the child inherit the acl(s) that it should.
*/
int
xfs_acl_inherit(vnode_t *vp, vattr_t *vap, xfs_acl_t *pdaclp)
{
xfs_acl_t cacl;
int error = 0;
/*
* If the parent does not have a default ACL, or it's an
* invalid ACL, we're done.
*/
if (vp == NULL)
return (0);
if (pdaclp == NULL || xfs_acl_invalid(pdaclp))
return (0);
/*
* Copy the default ACL of the containing directory to
* the access ACL of the new file and use the mode that
* was passed in to set up the correct initial values for
* the u::,g::[m::], and o:: entries. This is what makes
* umask() "work" with ACL's.
*/
memcpy(&cacl, pdaclp, sizeof(cacl));
xfs_acl_filter_mode(vap->va_mode, &cacl);
/* Set the mode to the ACL */
xfs_acl_setmode(vp, &cacl);
/*
* Set the Default and Access ACL on the file. The mode is already
* set on the file, so we don't need to worry about that.
*
* If the new file is a directory, its default ACL is a copy of
* the containing directory's default ACL.
*/
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, pdaclp, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, &error);
if (!error)
xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, &cacl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, &error);
return error;
}
/*
* Set up the correct mode on the file based on the supplied ACL. This
* makes sure that the mode on the file reflects the state of the
* u::,g::[m::], and o:: entries in the ACL. Since the mode is where
* the ACL is going to get the permissions for these entries, we must
* synchronize the mode whenever we set the ACL on a file.
*/
STATIC int
xfs_acl_setmode(vnode_t *vp, xfs_acl_t *acl)
{
vattr_t va;
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
int nomask = 1;
int i;
int error;
if (acl->acl_cnt == XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT)
return (0);
/*
* Copy the u::, g::, o::, and m:: bits from the ACL into the
* mode. The m:: bits take precedence over the g:: bits.
*/
va.va_mask = AT_MODE;
VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, 0, sys_cred, error);
if (error)
return error;
va.va_mask = AT_MODE;
va.va_mode &= ~(S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO);
ap = acl->acl_entry;
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ++i) {
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
va.va_mode |= ap->ae_perm << 6;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
gap = ap;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
nomask = 0;
va.va_mode |= ap->ae_perm << 3;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
va.va_mode |= ap->ae_perm;
break;
default:
break;
}
ap++;
}
/* Set the group bits from ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
if (gap && nomask)
va.va_mode |= gap->ae_perm << 3;
VOP_SETATTR(vp, &va, 0, sys_cred, error);
return error;
}
/*
* The permissions for the special ACL entries (u::, g::[m::], o::) are
* actually stored in the file mode (if there is both a group and a mask,
* the group is stored in the ACL entry and the mask is stored on the file).
* This allows the mode to remain automatically in sync with the ACL without
* the need for a call-back to the ACL system at every point where the mode
* could change. This function takes the permissions from the specified mode
* and places it in the supplied ACL.
*
* This implementation draws its validity from the fact that, when the ACL
* was assigned, the mode was copied from the ACL.
* If the mode did not change, therefore, the mode remains exactly what was
* taken from the special ACL entries at assignment.
* If a subsequent chmod() was done, the POSIX spec says that the change in
* mode must cause an update to the ACL seen at user level and used for
* access checks. Before and after a mode change, therefore, the file mode
* most accurately reflects what the special ACL entries should permit/deny.
*
* CAVEAT: If someone sets the SGI_ACL_FILE attribute directly,
* the existing mode bits will override whatever is in the
* ACL. Similarly, if there is a pre-existing ACL that was
* never in sync with its mode (owing to a bug in 6.5 and
* before), it will now magically (or mystically) be
* synchronized. This could cause slight astonishment, but
* it is better than inconsistent permissions.
*
* The supplied ACL is a template that may contain any combination
* of special entries. These are treated as place holders when we fill
* out the ACL. This routine does not add or remove special entries, it
* simply unites each special entry with its associated set of permissions.
*/
STATIC void
xfs_acl_sync_mode(mode_t mode, xfs_acl_t *acl)
{
int i;
int nomask = 1;
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
/*
* Set ACL entries. POSIX1003.1eD16 requires that the MASK
* be set instead of the GROUP entry, if there is a MASK.
*/
for (ap = acl->acl_entry, i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ap++, i++) {
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
ap->ae_perm = (mode >> 6) & 0x7;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
gap = ap;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
nomask = 0;
ap->ae_perm = (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
ap->ae_perm = mode & 0x7;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Set the ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
if (gap && nomask)
gap->ae_perm = (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
}
/*
* When inheriting an Access ACL from a directory Default ACL,
* the ACL bits are set to the intersection of the ACL default
* permission bits and the file permission bits in mode. If there
* are no permission bits on the file then we must not give them
* the ACL. This is what what makes umask() work with ACLs.
*/
STATIC void
xfs_acl_filter_mode(mode_t mode, xfs_acl_t *acl)
{
int i;
int nomask = 1;
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
/*
* Set ACL entries. POSIX1003.1eD16 requires that the MASK
* be merged with GROUP entry, if there is a MASK.
*/
for (ap = acl->acl_entry, i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ap++, i++) {
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
ap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 6) & 0x7;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
gap = ap;
break;
case ACL_MASK:
nomask = 0;
ap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
break;
case ACL_OTHER:
ap->ae_perm &= mode & 0x7;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Set the ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
if (gap && nomask)
gap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
}
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